University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2020

Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social
Control to Advance Social Justice Ends
Hadar Aviram
UC Hastings College of the Law, aviramh@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship

Recommended Citation
Hadar Aviram, Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social Control to Advance Social
Justice Ends, 68 Buff. L. Rev. 199 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1806

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Buffalo Law Review
VOLUME 68

JANUARY 2020

NUMBER 1

Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of
Punitive Social Control to Advance Social
Justice Ends
HADAR AVIRAM†
INTRODUCTION
Paul Manafort, one of the most reviled men connected
with the Russian involvement in Donald Trump’s ascent to
power, was convicted of multiple white collar crimes related
to his foreign activities.1 Newspapers reported that Manafort
was to serve his sentence at the notorious Rikers Island
prison in New York, in conditions of “isolation.”2 This
announcement caused an eruption of schadenfreude on social
media, which was countered by sobering remarks from
†Thomas E. Miller ‘73 Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law.
Much gratitude to Alessandro Corda, Johann Koehler, and Tobias Smith, for
their excellent suggestions, as well as to Guy Hamilton Smith, Garrick Percival,
Itay Ravid, Heather Schoenfeld, and others, for an excellent conversation on this
topic that took place at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting.
1. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1, United States v. Manafort, No. 17-CR00201-1 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2019) (judgment of guilty to conspiracy against the
United States and Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice); Judgment in a Criminal Case
at 1–2, United States v. Manafort, No. 1:18-cr-00083-TSE-1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 7,
2019) (judgment of guilty to subscribing to false United States Individual Income
Tax Returns, failure to file reports of foreign bank and financial accounts and
bank fraud).
2. William Rashbaum, Paul Manafort to Be Sent to Rikers, Where He Will Be
Held in Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/
04/nyregion/manafort-rikers-island-solitary-confinement.html.
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several progressive movement icons. Alexandria OcasioCortez reminded her followers: “A prison sentence is not a
license for gov torture and human rights violations. That’s
what solitary confinement is. Manafort should be released,
along with all people being held in solitary.”3 Shaun King,
architect of Real Justice, an organization dedicated to
reforming criminal justice by funding progressive
campaigns, remarked: “I see people excited to see Paul
Manafort sent to Rikers Island and put in solitary
confinement. 1. Rikers Island should be closed down 2.
Solitary confinement should be ended. We must be so
principled in our calls for reform that we want them even for
our enemies.”4
That these reminders were needed, coming on the heels
of a substantial legislative push to limit solitary confinement
in New York State5 is a testament to a conundrum in
progressive criminal justice ideology: what shall we do with
the powerful who transgress? “In its majestic equality,” said
Anatole France, “the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep
under bridges, beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread.”6
This maxim has resonated deeply with critical
criminologists, whose point of departure is deeply-seated
structural inequalities. For critical criminologists, law plays

3. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@RepAOC), TWITTER (June 5, 2019, 7:09 AM),
https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1136273861715120129?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7
Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1136273861715120129&ref_url=http
s%3A%2F%2Fthehill.com%2Fhomenews%2Fhouse%2F447056-ocasio-cortezsays-manafort-other-prisoners-should-be-released-from-solitary.
4. Shaun King (@shaunking), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 7:50 AM),
https://twitter.com/shaunking/status/1135921664598917120?ref_src=twsrc%5Et
fw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1135921664598917120&ref_url
=http%3A%2F%2Fcaliforniacorrectionscrisis.blogspot.com%2F2019%2F06%2F
more-progressive-punitivism-manafort.html.
5. Erika Leigh, More than 100 Lawmakers Sign on to Bill Limiting Solitary
Confinement, SPECTRUM NEWS (June 2, 2019), https://spectrumlocalnews.com/
nys/central-ny/news/2019/06/02/more-than-100-lawmakers-sign-on-to-bill-tolimit-solitary-confinement.
6. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE 105–15 (Calmann-Lévy ed., 5th ed.
1894).
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a crucial role in reflecting, and even deepening, the chasm
between the powerful and the powerless. Criminal
legislation is crafted to encompass behaviors of the powerless
while ignoring the harms perpetrated by the powerful, all
under the guise of universal, impersonal language. Law
enforcement unfairly targets “crimes in streets” committed
by the powerless, which are visible, and ignores “crimes in
suites” committed by the powerful. Charging decisions
discriminate against the powerless. Trials disadvantage the
powerless while offering advantages to the powerful. And
these differences are reinforced through sentencing
disparities between the powerful and the powerless.
In “The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies,”
Michael Fischl recounted a conversation with a colleague
who said, “The problem with critical legal studies is that it
didn’t offer any alternative program. Now I’m no great
defender of the rule of law, but what would you put in its
place?”7 This question, which Fischl opines “did us in,” could
well be asked of critical, radical, and Marxist criminologies.
If the problem is structural inequality, what is the solution?
In his retrospective of critical criminology, Alessandro de
Giorgi clarified the points of contention between liberal
criminologists and their reform agenda on one hand, and
radical criminologists who advocated revolution on the
other.8 But what kind of reform or revolution is necessary?
Should the correctional apparatus remain in place? Should
its focus change? If the problem is inequality, is the solution
alleviating law’s hold on the poor, or strengthening its grasp
on the rich?
This Essay examines the emergence of an academic and
popular discourse that advocates turning the cannons of the
punitive machine against the powerful. I identify this

7. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies,
17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 779, 780 (1992).
8. Alessandro de Giorgi, Reform or Revolution: Thoughts on Liberal and
Radical Criminologies, 40 SOC. JUST. 24, 27 (2014).
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discourse as “progressive punitivism.” Progressive
punitivism is a logic that wields the classic weapons of
punitive law—shaming, stigmatization, harsh punishment,
and denial of rehabilitation—in the service of promoting
social equality. This logic has permeated much of the
political conversation on the progressive left in the United
States, and while it has gained some hold in academic
discourse, particularly in the legal field, its core lies in the
leftist social media arena, where it has enjoyed considerable
popular appeal in the last few years. Progressive ire before,
and especially after, the election of Donald Trump to the
presidency, has flared around issues such as police
accountability for use of excessive force, especially against
people of color; the proliferation of sexual harassment,
assault and abuse by the powerful with too little
accountability; and the too-lenient legal response to
expressions of racism, xenophobia, and other forms of social
hatred and exclusion.
Progressive punitivism operates within the criminal
justice system in the context of a call to hold people perceived
as belonging to powerful groups accountable for their actions.
However, it also operates throughout the realm of social
media and public opinion, often compensating for the
perceived lack of formal consequences against the powerful
with intense bursts of informal social control, such as online
shaming and excoriation. These two realms—formal and
informal social control—frequently cross paths in
progressive punitivism in complex ways, often yielding
informal, democratized punitive power to those perceived as
powerless within the formal apparatus.
In the following pages, I attempt to sketch the main
features, origins and consequences of the progressive
punitive perspective. I start with an overview of the main
characteristics of progressive punitivism: turning the
existing punitive machine on the powerful, focusing on
identity and group politics as an epistemological resource for
identifying perpetrators, the concept of “leveling up”
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punishment, the preoccupation with victim voices, and the
idea of punishment as a catalyst for social change. I then
review the three key areas in which ideas of progressive
punitivism have gained visible popularity in recent times:
police abuse of force; sexual assault, including carceral
feminism and the #metoo movement; and hate crimes. I also
engage in a brief discussion of the interplay between the call
for formal consequences for lawbreaking and the
engagement in intense punitive expressions of informal
social control, particularly via shaming campaigns on social
media. I then expand the theoretical framework by
interrogating the intellectual and cultural sources of
progressive punitivism, examining radical and critical
criminology, second-wave feminism, and Communist China
as a surprising intellectual parallel. I conclude that the most
plausible source of progressive punitivism is conservative
punitivism. Americans of all political stripes have been
steeped for decades in a framework that sees criminal justice
as the quintessential solution for moral problems and victims
of crime as the premier moral interlocutors. American
criminal justice in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has
had a deep impact on the national psyche, and progressive
punitivism is, upon reflection, an application of this
mentality, rather than a deviation or revolutionary
reinterpretation of it. The Essay ends with a discussion of
the discontents of progressive punitivism and the dangers of
cottoning to it as a viable strategy for social justice reform.
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A. What Is Progressive Punitivism?
Progressive punitivism shares many overall laudable
social goals with other projects of progressive reform, such as
fostering equality and diversity, fighting oppression and
enfranchising the powerless. What is unique about
progressive punitivism, however, is its reliance on the
traditional toolbox of the criminal process as an avenue for
social change. Progressive punitive initiatives seek to
identify the powerful people who have long been served by
the oppressive legal apparatus, and subject them to formal
or informal social control, seeking legal enforcement against
them—arrests, criminal charges, criminal convictions,
prison sentences—or recurring to alternative ways of
punishment and stigma, typically through the arena of
unforgiving reputational harm.
Because of these goals, progressive punitivism is as
identity-driven as conservative punitivism. The pursuit of
criminal or social accountability is focused on the holders of
social or institutional advantage—law enforcement officers,
celebrities, and members of privileged social groups—as
targets. This orientation is understandable in that
progressive punitivism is, by nature, corrective: enforcing
the law against these powerful perpetrators is an effort to
balance the harms typically visited on vulnerable and
disenfranchised populations.
Relatedly, the comparison between the rebuke suffered
by the powerful and the powerless is often made for the
purpose of “leveling up.” Even as progressive advocates for
criminal reform call for more leniency in the criminal justice
system in the context of drawing comparisons across
demographics, the argument is made in the context of a plea
to treat the powerful comparator more harshly, rather than
the powerless one more leniently.
As with its conservative counterpart, progressive
punitivism is deeply preoccupied with victims, placing those
most traumatized by the transgression at the forefront of the
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demand for action and giving them a “voice.” But the
different political orientation means that the focus is on
categories of victims typically neglected by conservative
punitivism— women and people of color. When victims speak
up within the framework of progressive punitivism,
therefore, they stand not only for themselves, but also for the
disenfranchised groups that they represent. The symbolic
confrontation between victim and accuser is microcosmic
representation of a larger confrontation, in which the
powerless speak up about their victimization and demand
the accountability of the powerful.
A corollary of this systemic discourse is that the demand
for retribution goes beyond the individual needs of the
particular victim and is often perceived as a catalyst for
change. When a privileged perpetrator is called upon to
answer for crimes and wrongdoing, harsh retribution is not
merely hailed as a just outcome in his or her particular case;
it is also expected to have the trickle-down effect of
promoting social justice overall. Public excoriation and the
fall from grace of the powerful is not merely a just desert for
bad behavior, but also, in the manner of a Greek tragedy, a
“conversation starter,” the harbinger of reckoning,
understanding, and important steps toward remedying
structural inequalities.
B. Key Areas of Progressive Punitivism
Because of the progressive commitment to the idea of
fighting racism, sexism, and classism, among other harms of
inequality and discriminations, the main areas of visible
progressive punitivism concern people who are, whether
justly or unjustly, perceived as perpetrating these harms.
The first obvious arena, which directly relates to the
topic of this article, is sexual harassment and assault. The
overall commendable #metoo movement started a wave of
admissions and sharing on the part of victims of sexual
misconduct, but rather than inviting a dialogue about how to
reimagine social spaces in which everyone is treated with
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dignity and respect the movement has tended to focus on
bringing down people in high-profile cases. The harbinger of
the trend, admittedly the worst example of sexual offending
with impunity, was Harvey Weinstein, yielding a string of
confessions by actresses who were victimized by him.9 This
was followed by allegations of varying degrees of seriousness
against public figures: politicians,10 media personalities,11
actors,12 directors,13 and comedians,14 among others. In
addition, in one case, the lenient sentencing of Stanford
student Brock Turner for the sexual assault of an
unconscious woman behind a dumpster drew national ire not
only at him, but also at the judge, leading to a relentless, and
ultimately successful recall campaign.15 The Brock Turner
9. Maria Puente, Judge Rules Harvey Weinstein Sexual Assault Case Can
Move Forward to Trial, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/life/2018/12/20/harvey-weinstein-court-new-york-sex-crimes-charges-judge
/2294182002/.
10. Phil McCausland, Sen. Al Franken ‘Embarrassed and Ashamed’
Following Sexual Harassment Allegations, NBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/sen-al-franken-embarrassedashamed-following-sexual-harassment-allegations-n824026. For a nuanced
critique of the consequences Franken suffered, see Jane Mayer, The Case of Al
Franken, THE NEW YORKER (July 29, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2019/07/29/the-case-of-al-franken.
11. Associated Press, Garrison Keillor: Radio Station Reveals Broader Claims
of Sexual Harassment, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2018/jan/24/garrison-keillor-sexual-harassment-allegations.
12. Victoria Bekiempis, Kevin Spacey Faces Criminal Charge Over Alleged
Sexual Assault of Teenager, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 24, 2018), https://
www.theguardian.com/culture/2018/dec/24/kevin-spacey-alleged-sexual-assaultteenager-allegations.
13. Lisa France, Dylan Farrow Details Alleged Abuse by Woody Allen in Her
First Televised Interview, CNN (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/18/
entertainment/dylan-farrow-woody-allen-interview/index.html.
14. Melena Ryzik, Cara Buckley & Jodi Kantor, Louis C.K. Accused by 5
Women of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/11/09/arts/television/louis-ck-sexual-misconduct.html; Katie Way, I
Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari: It Turned Into the Worst Night of My Life, BABE
(Jan. 13, 2018), https://babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-28355.
15. See Law Professors’ Statement for the Independence of the Judiciary and
Against the Recall of Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky,
PALO ALTO ONLINE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/reports/
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example is one of special importance because the ire was
directed not only at the person committing crime with
perceived impunity, but also at the system for sentencing
him. The message resulting from the successful recall
campaign is that judges must be wary of public opinion and
shame campaigns when they consider sentencing.16
Unfortunately, those most likely to suffer from harsh judges
operating out of fear of excoriation are those most often
harmed by the criminal process: young, poor men of color,
very much unlike Turner himself.
While progressive punitivism extends broader than the
sexual misconduct issue, it is worthwhile to note that my
arguments here dovetail the nascent literature on carceral
feminism. Writers within the feminist movement,
specifically writers of color, have pointed out the dangers of
pursuing feminist goals through the carceral state. Carceral
feminism logics have been linked to the Violence Against
Women Act [VAWA],17 the anti-trafficking movement18 and
violence against women in general.19 Specifically, Nickie
Phillips and Nicholas Chagnon have linked carceral
feminism discourses to the Brock Turner outrage and Judge
Persky’s recall campaign.20 However, as I show below,
carceral feminism shares important characteristics with
1503112952.pdf.
16. See Guy Hamilton Smith, The Agony and Ecstasy of #MeToo: The Hidden
Costs of Reliance on Carceral Politics, Address at the Law and Society
Association Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. (2019).
17. Nancy Whittier, Carceral and Intersectional Feminism in Congress: The
Violence Against Women Act, Discourse, and Policy, 30 GENDER & SOC’Y 791, 809
(2016).
18. Jennifer Musto, Carceral Protectionism and Multi-Professional AntiTrafficking Human Rights Work in the Netherlands, 12 INT’L FEMINIST J. OF POL.
381, 384 (2010).
19. See generally David Gurnham, A Critique of Carceral Feminist Arguments
on Rape Myths and Sexual Scripts, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 141, 142 (2016).
20. Nickie Phillips & Nicholas Chagnon, “Six Months Is a Joke”: Carceral
Feminism and Penal Populism in the Wake of the Stanford Sexual Assault Case,
FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13 (Aug. 1, 2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/
10.1177/1557085118789782.
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other progressive movements deploying criminal justice for
progressive ends—including those that advance the interests
of people of color.
Another area in which progressive activists seek
criminal responsibility as an avenue of social justice is the
problem of police violence, particularly the use of lethal force.
The efforts to seek redress through the criminalization of
individual police officers were evident in the public outrage
over the shooting of Oscar Grant, an unarmed AfricanAmerican man, by Johannes Mehserle, a white Bay Area
Rapid Transit [BART] police officer, when protesters flooded
the court and some threatened Mehserle’s parents, as well as
his defense attorney.21 The public pressure was so intense
that the defendant won a motion to change the trial venue.22
Upon Mehserle’s conviction of a lesser-included offense,
public outrage broke again.23 The latest wave of protests
against the system’s ineptitude in exacting retribution from
officers occurred following the failure of the grand jury to
indict Darren Wilson, a white police officer, for the shooting
of Michael Brown, a young African American man.24 Similar
protests occurred when the grand jury did not indict the
officer responsible for the killing of Eric Garner.25 Legal
reforms adopted to rectify the failures to hold police officers
accountable have consisted, at least in the case of California,
of the removal of procedural protections specifically in cases
in which the defendants are police officers—a reform framed
21. Order of the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Change Venue at 15, People
v. Mehserle, (No. 161210), 2010 WL 4374304 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2009).
22. Id.
23. Corey Moore, Activists Protest Involuntary Manslaughter Verdict in
Mehserle Shooting Case, KPCC (July 9, 2010), https://www.scpr.org/news/2010/
07/09/17066/activists-protest-involuntary-manslaughter-verdict/.
24. Colleen Shalby, Protesters React to Ferguson Grand Jury Decision Not to
Indict Darren Wilson, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/nation/follow-reaction-ferguson-grand-jury-decision.
25. Ashley Southall, Protesters Fill Streets Across U.S. Over Decision in
Garner Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/
nyregion/protests-continue-after-grand-jury-decision-in-eric-garner-case.html.
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not as a discrimination against a particular category of
defendants but as an effort to correct a structural sociopolitical imbalance by creating a procedural imbalance.26
While the animus behind initiatives like the recall campaign
and the procedural amendment is understandable, there are
grounds to believe it is misdirected. As Franklin Zimring
explains, a systematic examination of lethal force incidents
reveals some important avenues for change in police
training, equipment, and culture, and the effort, energy, and
outrage directed at the pursuit of justice against individual
officers fails to address any of these more productive
solutions.27
A third target of progressive punitivism has been bigotry
and hate crimes. One of the most common progressive
reactions to horrific instances of mass murder animated by
white supremacy and misogyny (beyond the repeated calls
for gun control) has been to demand that these mass murders
be defined “terrorism.” This call, of course, has a symbolic
import: the tendency to equate terrorism with militant
Islam,28 and the resulting cultural representations of Islam
as terrorism,29 have animated waves of Islamophobia in
particular, and xenophobia in general, that have justified
deeply disturbing rhetoric and policies. Erin Miller explains:
In contrast to the relatively mundane objectives of researchers and
law enforcement, politicians, pundits, and the general public often
use the term “terrorism” as a weapon, a political football loaded
with a profoundly negative connotation and derisive judgment that
far surpasses most, if not all, other labels for violence. Compared to
other violent actors, perpetrators of terrorism tend to be viewed as
especially inhuman and depraved. Authorities on whose watch
terrorist attacks occur seem to be held to a far greater level of

26. S.B. 227, 2015–16 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
27. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL 239–45 (2017).
28. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA,
WAR, AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR 15 (2004).

THE

COLD

29. Rubina Ramji, Representations of Islam in American Culture and Film:
Becoming the ‘Other,’ in MEDIATING RELIGION: CONVERSATIONS IN MEDIA,
RELIGION AND CULTURE 65 (Jolyon Mitchell & Sophia Marriage eds., 2003).
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responsibility for not preventing these attacks. Perhaps this is
because terrorist violence is linked to a broader cause or ideology,
so observers view it as more predictable or preventable than
random acts of violence. Where conventional violence is merely a
matter of course; terrorism is a matter of national security.
As a result, invoking the label of terrorism or refraining from doing
so is a powerful tool that leverages this symbolism and coded
meaning. It is because of this power that the choice can be viewed
from all sides of the political spectrum as subterfuge, political
semantics, or racism. The question of whether or not authorities
and observers uniformly afford perpetrators the same consideration
regardless of their identity or their target is undoubtedly an
important one. A hypothetical attack carried out by a middle-aged
white male against a Planned Parenthood clinic could be an act of
terrorism inspired by anti-abortion ideology; it could also be an act
of domestic violence against his spouse who works at the clinic.
Likewise, a hypothetical attack carried out by a young Muslim
woman in an office building could be inspired by radical Islamism,
or by personal retribution. Regardless, there is little value added by
applying the label of terrorism sooner rather than later. We do not
need this label as a crutch to tell us how horrified we should be if
instead we can base this judgment on the details of the attack as
they are known.30

Shirin Sinnar documents progressive efforts to define
violent acts in the name of white nationalism as domestic
terrorism.31 She finds no legal or policy justifications for the
distinctions between “domestic” and “international”
terrorism; the magnitude of the threats and the civil liberties
at stake are comparable in both cases, and federalism in
itself is not a sufficient justification for a different approach.
On the other hand, she criticizes efforts to “ratchet up” the
criminalization of domestic terrorists in the name of
equality, efforts drawn directly from the progressive
punitivism playbook. As Sinnar explains, the existing laws
and processes dealing with what is currently understood as
terrorism are rife with civil liberty problems and due process
violations, which should be remedied, rather than expanded

30. Erin Miller, Is It Terrorism? Why Does It Matter?, START (Feb. 5, 2016),
https://www.start.umd.edu/news/terrorism-why-does-it-matter.
31. See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of ‘Domestic’ and
‘International’ Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1351 (2019).
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and replicated in new contexts. She is especially concerned
about creating punitive and oppressive enforcement
mechanisms that might widen beyond what is desirable for
the progressives who propose them, such as defining “black
identity extremists” as terrorists. She also raises the problem
of solving what are essentially political and structural
problems primarily through the mechanism of the criminal
law.32
The footprint of progressive punitivism against hate
crimes extends beyond the official criminal process too, such
as in the case of Aaron Schlossberg, an attorney filmed
hurling racial epithets at restaurant workers.33 Progressive
activists, in retort, publicized Schlossberg’s name, brought
about the loss of his office lease,34 and held a mariachi party
below his home after making his address public.35 Recently,
following the murder of Nia Wilson, an African American
young woman, by a white man in a chilling, unprovoked
attack, Oakland Mayor Libby Schaaf publicly argued for
flipping the burden of proof in hate crime cases.36

32. See Shirin Sinnar, Confronting Domestic Terrorism Means Confronting
White Nationalism, SLATE (Mar. 15, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/
2019/03/domestic-terrorism-christchurch-white-nationalism-trump-muslimban.html.
33. Eric Levenson, Paul Murphy & Gianluca Mezzofiore, New York Attorney
in Racist Rant Has History of Confrontations, CNN (May 17, 2019), https://www.
cnn.com/2018/05/17/us/aaron-schlossberg-attorney-racist-rant/index.html.
34. Deepti Hajela, N.Y. Lawyer Who Ranted at Spanish Speakers Faces
Eviction, Complaint—and a Mariachi Band, USA TODAY (May 18, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/smallbusiness/2018/05/18/aaro
n-schlossberg-evicted-new-york-lawyer-loses-office-space-after-rant/622300002/.
35. Sam Wolfson, New Yorkers Respond to Lawyer’s Racist Rant with ‘Latin
Party’ Outside His House, THE GUARDIAN (May 18, 2018), https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/18/aaron-schlossberg-racist-lawyer-newyork-latin-party.
36. “‘It raises the question about our legal system and how we apply the rules
of evidence,’ said Mayor Libby Schaaf (D), who is white and was born in the city.
‘It may be time to recognize that if there is no explicit racial bias, but there is
implicit racial bias, then maybe the burden of proof should shift to the defense.’”
Scott Wilson, As Stakes Rise in Nia Wilson Case, Simmering Racial Tensions
Intensify in Oakland, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
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C. Progressive Punitivism Technologies: Formal and
Informal Social Control
As exemplified in the Sections above, progressive
punitivism acts both in the formal criminal justice realm and
in the realm of public opinion. In all three arenas discussed
above—police-involved shootings, sexual harassment and
abuse, and hate crimes—activists have pressed for a more
effective criminal justice system, more prosecutions, more
convictions, and harsher punishment.
Overall, the efforts to make the criminal justice system
more responsive to the need to punish the powerful have not
yielded considerable success, and largely because of these
failures—especially juxtaposed with the efficiency and
banality in which the process engulfs and oppresses the
powerless—progressive activists largely perceive the
criminal process as broken. The overall lack of trust in the
ability of the criminal justice system to deliver results in the
form of indictments and harsh sentences for privileged
defendants is often directly linked to the pursuit of
alternative means of social control. Opining about #metoo,
Catharine MacKinnon writes:
This logjam [between official legal prohibition and lack of
enforcement followup—H.A.], which has long paralyzed effective
legal recourse for sexual harassment, is finally being broken.
Structural misogyny, along with sexualized racism and class
inequalities, is being publicly and pervasively challenged by
women’s voices. The difference is, power is paying attention.
Powerful individuals and entities are taking sexual abuse seriously
for once and acting against it as never before. No longer liars, no
longer worthless, today’s survivors are initiating consequences none
.com/national/as-stakes-rise-in-nia-wilson-case-simmering-racial-tensions-inten
sify-in-oakland/2018/08/23/8f89e5a2-9c05-11e8-8d5e-c6c594024954_story.html?
utm_term=.0db948e7dbce. As in the case of the judicial recall campaign and
changes in the laws for prosecuting police officers, there are two main dangers
here. The worse is that removing constitutional and legal protections only for
unlikeable criminals, while framed as an effort to correct a structural imbalance,
could have an overall corrosive effect on due process. The lesser harm is the
expenditure of precious activist energy on vindictiveness and schadenfreude
rather than on structural reform. These harms and others are discussed below.
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of them could have gotten through any lawsuit—in part because the
laws do not permit relief against individual perpetrators, but more
because they are being believed and valued as the law seldom has.
Women have been saying these things forever. It is the response to
them that has changed.37

MacKinnon’s observations can be generalized to other
aspects of progressive punitivism: an understandable, albeit
controversial, corollary of the despair of activists from a
responsive criminal process has been the recurrence to
public, primarily online, methods of public excoriation and
shaming. The failure to obtain a harsh sentence for Brock
Turner led to an orchestrated online campaign to tarnish the
reputation of Judge Persky, resulting in his recall. The public
excoriation of public figures like Louis C.K. and Aziz Ansari
has led to informal “moratoria” placed on their public
appearances, and on public criticism and protest wherever
they go. In the court of public opinion, particularly with the
permanence of online notoriety, there is no sanctioned “end”
to the proceedings. As journalist Jon Ronson argues,
recovering one’s reputation from the shambles of informal
social control and online mobbing can be an effort that takes
long years and carries considerable monetary costs, which
often exceed the consequences foreseen by those leading the
mob on.38 The availability of online platforms also implies
that revealing a person’s address, or that of their relatives,
can lead not only to inconvenience and anguish but also to
placing people in real danger.39 Naturally, the left did not
invent the recurrence to informal but pernicious modes of
public shaming, nor do these tactics by any means
characterize only the left;40 however, shaming, punitivism,
37. Catharine MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-lawlegal-system.html.
38. JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED 201–04 (2015).
39. See Jasmine McNealy, What Is Doxxing, and Why Is It So Scary?,
CONVERSATION (May 16, 2018), https://theconversation.com/what-is-doxxing-andwhy-is-it-so-scary-95848.
40. Andrew Quodling,

Doxxing,

Swatting and

the New Trends in
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and online endangerment raise particular difficulties when
employed by a political constituency invested in criminal
justice reform.
It is possible to examine the reliance of progressive
punitivism on “disruptive” social control technologies, in lieu
of the formal social control apparatus, as a particular
example of a broader trend. In The Submerged State,41
Suzanne Mettler argues that, in recent decades, federal
policymakers have increasingly offered benefits in subtle and
invisible ways—tax breaks and payments to private third
parties in lieu of direct disbursement of benefits. This
sublimation of the role of the state in providing services and
social benefits has resulted not only in conservative hostility
to governmental involvement (in healthcare and gun control,
to name just two examples) but also in increasing progressive
efforts to “hide” an agenda of governmental social benefits.
The structural difficulties in enacting policy reforms—or
even in obtaining recognition for positive policy changes—
have probably influenced progressives, as well as
conservatives, in a despair of the state’s role in correcting
criminal justice imbalances, and may have contributed to the
increasing reliance on “disruptive” technologies to even the
criminal justice odds against the powerful.
A broader discussion of the interplay between
progressive punitivism and the cultural logics underpinning
these informal social control mechanisms exceeds the
framework of this Essay. However, the centrality of online
interactions to the informal aspects of progressive
punitivism raises an important question: how much of this is
new, and what, if any, are the ideological roots of this trend?
We now turn to this question.

Online Harassment, CONVERSATION (Apr. 21, 2015), https://theconversation.com/
doxxing-swatting-and-the-new-trends-in-online-harassment-40234.
41. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 9 (2011).
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D. The Intellectual-Criminological Roots of Progressive
Punitivism
Seen through the lens of late-20th-century American
punitivism, progressive punitivism does not appear to have
a particularly radical agenda. It does not call for divesting
from the idea of punishment as a whole, nor does it provide
a fresh, interesting alternative to criminal justice as the
master framework for social improvement. Because its
ideology seems to be merely a political redirection of the
existing punitive framework, progressive punitivism does
not have clearly identifiable intellectual precursors in radical
thought. Indeed, searching for the roots of progressive
punitivism, even in the realm of critical criminological
perspectives, proves elusive, for several important reasons.
First, a dimension that holds immense importance for
current activists—race—entered the radical criminology
conversation at a surprisingly late stage. Radical
criminologists of the 1970s adopted a largely, albeit not
exclusively, Marxist standpoint, 42 which assumes a social
structure in which the law interacts with largely two
communities: the oppressors or the oppressed. Whether
theoreticians assumed that the law worked as the
handmaiden of the former, invariably at its behest 43 or as
a relatively autonomous part of the superstructure that
often works to the benefit of the powerful in that it
preserves the status quo, 44 what is now referred to as
“intersectionality,” was unrecognized in this literature,
and the category suffering from the law’s oppressive arm
conflated race with class. Some writings from this era do

42. See Thomas J. Bernard, Distinction Between Conflict and Radical
Criminology, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 362, 363 (1981); Elmer H. Johnson,
Radical Criminology and Marxism: A Fallible Relationship, 3 CRIM. JUST. REV.
53, 58 (1978).
43. ISAAC D. BALBUS, MARXISM AND DOMINATION 201 (1982).
44. Alan Stone, The Place of Law in the Marxian Structure-Superstructure
Archetype, 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 39, 48 (1985).
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not mention race at all. 45 Those that do mention racial
injustices as a private example of class oppression. 46
Critical discussions of the flaws of Marxist criminology
tended to address other aspects of the Marxian structure
that were unfalsifiable, difficult to substantiate
empirically, or futile in accounting for overcriminalization
and oppression in Socialist societies. 47 A comprehensive
critique of the omission of race would have to wait until
1987, when Darnell Hawkins argued that the class-based
rhetoric of radical or Marxist criminology needed to be
heavily modified to account for racial discrimination. 48
Hawkins lobbed his critique not at pure Marxist
criminology, whose lack of subtlety and nimbleness would
prove useless for his purposes, but toward the “bigger tent”
of conflict criminology. Hawkins argued that certain
aspects of racial disparities in sentencing, which would
appear anomalous from a class-based conflict criminology
perspective, made sense considering how racism operated
on the ground. Relying on the seminal capital punishment
study by David Baldus et al., 49 Hawkins stressed that
racial critiques of criminal justice must pay attention to
the race of the victim, not only that of the offender; indeed,
leniency toward Black perpetrators, especially in the
45. See generally WILLIAM CHAMBLISS, CRIME AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 2
(1968); AUSTIN TURK, POLITICAL CRIMINALITY: THE DEFIANCE AND DEFENSE OF
AUTHORITY 11 (1982).
46. MICHAEL LYNCH & W. BYRON GROVES, A PRIMER IN RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
(1986).
47. JAMES INCIARDI, RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: THE COMING CRISES 27–33 (1980).
48. See Darnell Hawkins, Beyond Anomalies: Rethinking the Conflict
Perspective on Race and Criminal Punishment, 65 SOC. FORCES 719, 721 (1987).
49. See David Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Arbitrariness
and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to
State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133 (1986); David Baldus, Charles
Pulaski, & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661
(1983); David Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles Pulaski, Monitoring and
Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (1984–85).
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American South, which at first glance was at odds with the
critical criminology prediction of severity, could be
explained as state indifference toward Black lives.
Granted, in 1987 Hawkins would have seen in his
rearview mirror not only conflict, radical, and Marxist
criminologists, who were either oblivious to race or
conflated it with class, but also a rich sociological heritage
examining racial discrimination in criminal justice,
starting with W.E.B. DuBois, himself an enthusiastic
communist and fighter for class equality. 50 In the
American context, the 1980s and 1990s brought about a
wealth
of
literature
specifically
about
racial
discrimination. These included quantitative sociological
and econometric studies, 51 including studies specifically
focused on the race and class intersection, 52 as well as
articles summarizing research findings and concluding
that discrimination occurs broadly 53 and normative and
doctrinal commentaries on the need to level the playing

50. Dan S. Green & Earl Smith, W.E.B. DuBois and the Concepts of Race and
Class, 44 PHYLON 262, 262 (1983).
51. See Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison
Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743, 743 (1993); George Briges, Robert
Crutchfield & Edith Simpson, Crime, Social Structure and Criminal Punishment:
White and Nonwhite Rates of Imprisonment, 34 SOC. PROBS. 345, 345 (1987).
52. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall
Kennedy’s “Politics of Distinction,” 83 GEO. L. J. 2547, 2547 (1995); Miles Harer
& Darrell Steffensmeier, The Differing Racial Effects of Economic Inequality on
Black and White Rates of Violence, 70 SOC. FORCES 1035, 1035–36 (1992); Randall
Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1994).
53. See Darnell F. Hawkins, John H. Laub, Janet L. Lauritsen & Lyn
Cothern, Race, Ethnicity, and Serious and Violent Juvenile Offending, JUV. JUST.
BULL., June 2000, at 1, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/181202.pdf; Carl E.
Pope & William Feyerherm, Minorities and the Juvenile Justice System, OFF.
JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, July 1995, at 1, 15; Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty
Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process,
3 CRIM. JUST. 427 (2000); Michael Tonry, Racial Disproportion in US Prisons, 34
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 97 (1994); Marjorie S. Zatz, The Convergence of Race,
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class on Court Decisionmaking: Looking Towards the 21st
Century, 2 CRIM. JUST. 503 (2000).
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field.54 Overall, this literature does not evince a call to
“level up,” that is, sentence white offenders more severely.
The leading normative commentators, such as Angela
Davis and Paul Butler, call for the opposite—a focus on
decriminalizing, or nullifying verdicts of, black offenders.
Second, even within the conversation about class, until
fairly recently most scholarship has focused on the
injustices of a seemingly class-blind system that focused
its oppressive power on the poor, rather than on the
impunity of the rich. For one thing, the nature of crimes of
the powerful has changed, and would have been more
difficult to detect. Since the 18th century, financial crashes
were typically failures of monetary policy, not banking
practice.55
An important piece of the puzzle involves political
framing. Criminologist John Hagan argues that the “age of
Reagan” in American criminal justice, which he dates
between 1974 and 2008, was characterized by a retreat
from the “age of Roosevelt’s” focus on rehabilitation,
corporate regulation, and positivist criminology toward an
aggressive focus on crimes of the poor, particularly through
the vehicle of the War on Drugs. 56 Simultaneously, the
later era saw large-scale deregulation of businesses, which
opened up “opportunities, incentives, and even
rationalizations of white-collar crime.” Thus, for Hagan,
the focus on harsh treatment of street crimes happened in
tandem with the unleashing of corporate crime.
There were also epistemological and methodological

54. See Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 841, 841 (1997); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power
in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995); Angela J. Davis,
Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
13 (1998); Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and
Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95 (2000).
55. Benedikt Koehler, History of Financial Disasters, 1763–1995 (2006).
56. JOHN HAGAN, WHO ARE

THE

FROM THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE

CRIMINALS? THE POLITICS OF CRIME POLICY
AGE OF REAGAN 2, 8–9, 19 (2010).
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difficulties in identifying the culprits. As Daniel Hirschman
explains, the now popular concept of the “top-one-percenters”
was obscured from public discourse until the 2000s, even
though at that point the data revealed that top income
earners in the 1990s received a larger share of income than
at any point since the Great Depression, and that their
incomes had begun a dramatic upward climb in the early
1980s.57 Hirschman argues that shifts in top incomes
remained under the radar, because the relevant economic
disciplines that produced knowledge about income inequality
had “blind spots” in important places: Macroeconomists
focused on labor’s share of national income, but did not
examine the distribution of income between individuals;
labor economists, on the other hand, drew on newly available
survey data to explain wage disparities in terms of
education, age, work experience, race, and gender. These
surveys failed to capture movements among top income
earners, and so this group, which figured, and were reviled,
prominently in the discourse produced by Occupy Wall Street
and other international movements for economic equality.58
This is not to say that early criminologists ignored the
crimes of the powerful. One area of scholarship that has
always paid attention to these is, of course, white-collar
crime. As early as 1945, Edwin Sutherland saw the
analysis of white-collar crime as an important theoretical
challenge, wondering whether it was appropriate to
expand the traditionally understood concept of “crime” to
include it,59 and eventually make the study of it as one of
the lynchpins of his career. 60 Donald Cressey certainly
thought so upon interviewing incarcerated embezzlers
57. Daniel Hirschman, Inventing the Economy 158 (2016) (unpublished
dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the University of Michigan).
58. Craig Calhoun, Occupy Wall Street in Perspective, 64 BRIT. J. SOC. 26, 26–
27 (2013).
59. Edwin H. Sutherland, Is “White Collar Crime” Crime?, 10 AM. SOC. REV.
132 (1945).
60. EDWIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 1 (1983).
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about their rationalizations for their crimes, 61 yielding
responses astonishingly similar to those that juvenile
delinquents gave Gresham Sykes and David Matza in their
own study.62
Some white-collar crime literature does have a punitive
focus, or more accurately, a critique of the trivialization of
white-collar crime. This literature, for the most part, sees the
impunity of white-collar criminals as a consequence of the
overpowering neoliberal ethos.63 Snider and others64 discuss
the partial impact of social movements opposing white-collar
crime, which argue for stiffer punishments for these
criminals. The success of these movements in procuring more
severe punishment for corporate criminals is confirmed in a
study by Van Slyke and Bales.65 The study examined
sentencing levels before and after the 2001–2002 whitecollar crime scandals epitomized by the fall of Enron, and
found that, while overall sentencing levels evince leniency
toward white-collar criminals compared to street criminals,
sentences did become more severe in the aftermath of Enron.
Importantly, some scholars have not found white-collar
crime sentences to be lighter than street-crime sentences;
however, the increased pressure for prosecution of these
crimes yields lighter sentences.66
Third, the call for punitivism in the context of feminist
61. See Donald Cressey, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: A STUDY
PSYCHOLOGY OF EMBEZZLEMENT 136-37 (1973).

IN THE

SOCIAL

62. See Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A
Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 664, 666–68 (1957).
63. Laureen Snider, The Sociology of Corporate Crime: An Obituary, 4
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 169 (2000).
64. Jack Katz, The Social Movement
2 CRIMINOLOGY REV. Y.B. 161, 162–65 (1980).

Against

White-Collar

Crime,

65. Shanna Van Slyke & William D. Bales, A Contemporary Study of the
Decision to Incarcerate White‐Collar and Street Property Offenders, 14
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 217, 217–19 (2012).
66. Ilene H. Nagel & John L. Hagan, The Sentencing of White-Collar
Criminals in Federal Courts: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 1427, 1428 (1982).
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criminology, linked with the “carceral feminism” movement,
heavily contrasts with the race and class materials in that
feminist criminology has tended to focus on male criminality
much more saliently than critical race scholarship has
focused on white criminality, or Marxist scholarship on
crimes of the wealthy. Even though much of feminist
criminological scholarship raises questions about the
constant use of a male lens—including the historical focus on
male criminality and the paucity of research on female
criminality67—a substantial subset of feminist studies focus
on women as victims or on the gender ratio between male
and female offenders. While this scholarship often assumes
that criminality has always been a male phenomenon—a
point disputed by both sociologists and historians68—it has
had the power to focus the conversation on male aggression,
an important point for many second-wave feminists
concerned about violence against, and exploitation of,
women.
Indeed, some second-wave and radical feminism writings
seem to be harbingers of carceral feminism in particular and
progressive punitivism in general. Catharine MacKinnon’s
early writings about sexual harassment in the workplace
foreshadowed the logics and techniques of the #metoo
movement.69 As mentioned above, writing in the aftermath

67. FRANCES HEIDENSOHN, WOMEN AND CRIME 145–47 (2d ed. 1995); Kimberly
J. Cook, Has Criminology Awakened from Its “Androcentric Slumber”?,
11 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 334, 335 (2016).
68. Much of this discussion suffers from serious ahistoricism. See NICOLA
LACEY, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CHARACTER: FROM MOLL FLANDERS TO TESS OF THE
D’URBERVILLES 2–7 (2008); LUCIA ZEDNER, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CUSTODY IN
VICTORIAN ENGLAND 1–2 (1991); Malcolm M. Feeley & Hadar Aviram, Social
Historical Studies of Women, Crime and Courts, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 151
(2010); Malcolm M. Feeley & Deborah L. Little, The Vanishing Female: The
Decline of Women in the Criminal Process, 1687–1912, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719
(1981).
69. Ginia Bellafante, Before #MeToo, There Was Catharine A. MacKinnon and
Her Book ‘Sexual Harassment of Working Women’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/books/review/metoo-workplace-sexualharassment-catharine-mackinnon.html.
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of #metoo, MacKinnon embraced the movement’s
ethos, opining that the online outrage and excoriation
campaigns that, in part, characterized the movement are an
outcome of the incompetence of formal criminal law in
addressing sexual harassment.70 For an even more extreme
example of the antecedents of carceral feminism, it is
interesting to consider Valerie Solanas’ SCUM manifesto, in
which the ultimate solution for the exploitation and
oppression of women lies in the annihilation of men:
SCUM will kill all men who are not in the Men’s Auxiliary of SCUM.
Men in the Men’s Auxiliary are those men who are working
diligently to eliminate themselves, men who, regardless of their
motives, do good, men who are playing ball with SCUM. A few
examples of the men in the Men’s Auxiliary are: men who kill men;
biological scientists who are working on constructive programs, as
opposed to biological warfare; journalists, writers, editors,
publishers and producers who disseminate and promote ideas that
will lead to the achievement of SCUM’s goals; faggots who, by their
shimmering, flaming example, encourage other men to de-man
themselves and thereby make themselves relatively inoffensive;
men who consistently give things away—money, things, services;
men who tell it like it is (so far not one ever has), who put women
straight, who reveal the truth about themselves, who give the
mindless male females correct sentences to parrot, who tell them a
woman’s primary goal in life should be to squash the male sex (to
aid men in this endeavor SCUM will conduct Turd Sessions, at
which every male present will give a speech beginning with the
sentence: “I am a turd, a lowly abject turd,” then proceed to list all
the ways in which he is. His reward for doing so will be the
opportunity to fraternize after the session for a whole, solid hour
with the SCUM who will be present. Nice, clean-living male women
will be invited to the sessions to help clarify any doubts and
misunderstandings they may have about the male sex); makers and
promoters of sex books and movies, etc., who are hastening the day
when all that will be shown on the screen will be Suck and Fuck
(males, like the rats following the Pied Piper, will be lured by Pussy
to their doom, will be overcome and submerged by and will
eventually drown in the passive flesh that they are); drug pushers
and advocates, who are hastening the dropping out of men. 71

70. Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoolaw-legal-system.html.
71. VALERIE SOLANAS, SCUM MANIFESTO (Matriarchy Study Group 1983)
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Arguably, it was easier for feminism to make the leap
from protecting the oppressed to punishing the oppressors
because its focus has, for the most part, not been on female
criminality but on female victimization. Moreover, feminists
who wrote about the former, just like nonfeminist writers
about gender and crime, have faced a picture of official
statistics in which women are underrepresented in the
criminal population. By contrast, critical writers in the area
of class and race have had to first tackle the hurdle of the
overcriminalization of the oppressed population and pull the
official statistics’ wool off their audience’s eyes in pointing
out the crimes of the powerful. But even in these other areas,
some writers have finally turned the focus onto the crimes
that remained obscured in enforcement statistics. Indeed, in
recent years, criminological theory has come to see all of
these categories—white criminals, male criminals, wealthy
criminals, corporate criminals—as part of an overarching
category of “crimes of the powerful.” A recent anthology,
edited by Gregg Barak,72 begins with a complaint about the
paucity of evidence about the existence and harms of these
crimes, even though they victimize far more people than
street crimes:
In part . . . the crimes and victims of the powerful remain relatively
invisible thanks to the concerted efforts of lawyers, governments,
and corporations to censor or suppress these disreputable pursuits
from going viral when they succeed. This absence of knowledge also
continues, in part, because the discipline of criminology spends only
5 percent of its time researching, teaching, and writing about
“white-collar” crime while devoting 95 percent of its time to “bluecollar” crime . . . even this 5 percent may be inflated because much
of what passes for researching and teaching about “white-collar”
crime (i.e., embezzlement, identity theft, insurance fraud) not only
has little in common with the crimes of the powerful, but also are
actually crimes against the powerful.

The categories reviewed in the book include crimes of

(1967), https://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/shivers/rants/scum.html.
72. THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
POWERFUL 1 (Gregg Barak ed. 2015).
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globalization, corporate crimes, environmental crimes,
financial crimes, state crimes, state-corporate crimes and
state-routinized crimes.
Several important themes stand out. First, the analysis
of crimes of the powerful is, by necessity, global; many such
crimes happen across borders and their perpetrators benefit
from the ability to hide behind borders and hop across
jurisdictions. Second, a conversation about the crimes of the
powerful requires expanding the definition of “crime”
because the problem often runs deeper than merely lax
enforcement—many of these crimes are simply not socially
understood as crimes or legally coded as such. This is
especially salient in the context of environmental crime: the
field of green criminology explicitly utilizes the concept of
“harm” rather than “crime” to define the behaviors of
concern.73 This moniker encompasses harms that are not
recognized as crimes either because the victims—nonhuman
animals or the environment—are not imbued with rights or
legal personhood, or because they tend to disproportionally
harm disenfranchised people who have less power to claim
their legal rights.74
Third, the common theme running through these
criminal and harmful behaviors is the avoidance of
sanctions, but “sanctions” are broadly defined: they are
certainly not limited to the incarceration of individuals.
The consequences advocated by scholars of crimes of the
powerful address, first and foremost, the needs of the

73. See MICHAEL LYNCH, MICHAEL A. LONG, PAUL B. STRETESKY & KIMBERLY L.
BARRETT, GREEN CRIMINOLOGY: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1–20
(2017); Nigel South, Avi Brisman, and Piers Beirne, A Guide to a Green
Criminology, in THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF GREEN
CRIMINOLOGY 27–42 (Nigel South & Avi Brisman eds., 2012); ROB WHITE,
TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: TOWARD AN ECO-GLOBAL CRIMINOLOGY 4
(2011); ROB WHITE & DIANE HECKENBERG, GREEN CRIMINOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM (2014).
74. AVI BRISMAN & NIGEL SOUTH, GREEN CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY:
CONSTRUCTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM, CONSUMERISM, AND RESISTANCE TO
ECOCIDE 2–6, 51–53 (2014).

2020]

PROGRESSIVE PUNITIVISM

225

victims. In the case of environmental crime, this might
require extensive cleaning of polluted areas, deforestation
or biodiversity offsetting, 75 rewilding76 and regulating
industries like trophy hunting for the benefit of
biodiversity and native populations. 77 Thus, the tools of
remedy and enforcement are as diverse and creative as the
range of crimes they address, not necessarily limited to the
conventional tools of law enforcement and criminal
prosecution.
Save for some feminist criminology sources, it is
difficult to situate the progressive punitivism trend in
legacies of radical and critical criminological discourses.
But in searching for more obvious parallels, I encountered
a disturbing analogy between progressive punitivism and
the criminological logics underpinning the Communist
Chinese criminal law.
While
criminalization,
tribunals,
and
harsh
punishment were part and parcel of the Cultural
Revolution, China didn’t actually have an official criminal
code until 1979. The Maoist authorities had drafted one,
but Mao believed it unwise to codify a criminal law that
later might restrain the party. Nonetheless, in one of his
classic works he explicitly states that whether a particular
behavior is to be handled through punishment or with
compassion depends on the locus of the perpetrator in the
class structure:78

75. David Takacs, Are Koalas Fungible? Biodiversity Offsetting and the Law,
26 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 161 (2018).
76. John Hintz, Some Political Problems of Rewilding Nature, 10 ETHICS,
PLACE & ENV’T 177 (2007).
77. Informing Decisions on Trophy Hunting, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION
NATURE, Sept. 2016, at 2, https://www.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_informing
decisionsontrophyhuntingv1.pdf.
OF

78. MAO TSE-TUNG, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the
People, in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG (last visited Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv
5_58.htm.
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The people’s democratic dictatorship uses two methods. Towards
the enemy, it uses the method of dictatorship, that is, for as long
a period of time as is necessary it does not permit them to take
part in political activity and compels them to obey the law of the
People’s Government, to engage in labour and, through such
labour, be transformed into new men. Towards the people; on the
contrary, it uses the method of democracy and not of compulsion,
that is, it must necessarily let them take part in political activity
and does not compel them to do this or that but uses the method
of democracy to educate and persuade. Such education is selfeducation for the people, and its basic method is criticism and
self-criticism.

This deliberate focus of the criminal apparatus on
some and not on others came to characterize the eventual
1979 code. As Donald Clarke and James Feinerman
argue,79 the question of what constitutes a crime is
deliberately nebulous in the criminal code, and highly
dependent on the perpetrator’s location on the class food
chain:
The Criminal Law (CL) does not so much define which acts are
punishable as prescribe what the sanctions shall be when
relatively severe punishments are deemed in order. The
definition of crime is accomplished outside the Criminal Law by
reference to political exigencies or generally accepted standards
of morality. There is little perceived danger in allowing
government officials to impose their own standards of morality,
since Chinese state ideology does not accept the legitimacy of
multiple standards of morality.
Consider, for example, the provision for analogy (Article 79 of the
CL): a “crime” not stipulated in the CL (or elsewhere) may be
punished according to the most nearly applicable article. This
shows that if rules defining crime are “law,” then the very notion
of “crime” is not a “legal” concept; the determination of whether
a particular act constitutes a crime is something that must take
place outside the CL. Thus, while the CL tells you what
punishment to apply for a particular crime, it is often unhelpful
in determining whether a crime has been committed. In this
respect, the CL resembles the rules for punishment of Imperial
China, which stipulated any number of punishable acts in great
detail, but also contained provisions allowing for analogy and

79. Donald C. Clarke and James V. Feinerman, Antagonistic Contradictions:
Criminal Law and Human Rights in China, 141 CHINA Q. 135, 137–39 (1995).
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punishing “doing what ought not to be done.”
The Special Part lists various crimes and their punishments.
Pride of place goes to counter-revolutionary crimes, which are
defined as “all acts endangering the People’s Republic of China
committed with the goal of overthrowing the political power of
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system” [but
are very rare despite their textual prominence . . . . The other
chapters in the Special Part cover crimes of endangering public
security, undermining the socialist economic order, infringement
of personal and democratic rights, property violation, disruption
of the order of social administration, disruption of marriage and
the family, and dereliction of duty and corruption.
The Special Part is a relatively skimpy 103 articles . . . . One
reason for the relative simplicity of the Chinese CL is that the
provision on analogy offers an escape hatch in case of imperfect
or careless drafting. Another reason is that the CL is
supplemented by numerous other pieces of special legislation
either specifically criminalizing a certain act or prohibiting an
act and providing vaguely that “where it constitutes a crime,
criminal responsibility shall be affixed,” without providing any
guidance as to under what circumstances the performance of a
prohibited act would constitute a crime. Finally, it must be
remembered that the CL is as much a political text as a legal one;
its drafters were concerned with providing a legal basis for state
action, not with worries about due process, and it was designed
to be used by judicial and public security cadres with a low
educational level. Although the late 1980s and early 1990s have
seen a movement among the Chinese legal community to revise
the wording of the Criminal Law in an attempt to make it
technically more elegant, no revision has yet taken place.

Essentially, what Clarke and Feinerman are
describing is a punishment system that relies on the
sentiments of the communist order toward the offender to
even make the decision whether a crime has been
committed.
But
a
possible—and
reasonable—
counterargument could be that all criminal codes are,
covertly, Maoist “little red books” by virtue of differential
enforcement. After all, isn’t a city ordinance that prohibits
any person from sitting or lying on a city sidewalk, but
yields fines only against poor, homeless people, exactly the
same as “political texts” that “impose [their] own standard
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of morality?”80 Is there an operative distinction between
laws that explicitly target the poor and laws that do so
under the cover of neutral language?
It is possible, for example, to argue that the latter
legislative style—a law that purports to criminalize in a
neutral, universal way, but is enforced in a way that
targets members of a particular class—is abhorrent in a
way that its explicitly classist, racist, or sexist counterpart
is not: it is dishonest and generates false consciousness
about the supposedly fair operation of the legal system. 81
In that respect, openly saying, “severely punish the rich”
is a statement of integrity. However, this rationale does
not neatly address what happens in the context of
progressive punitivism for two main reasons.
First, the days in which the mainstream public was in
the dark about differential enforcement in the United
States are long gone. The disparities that critical
criminologists have been studying for decades—racialized
police activity, ideological bias in charging decisions and
sentencing disparities for members of different races and
classes—are all out in the open and available far beyond
insular academic circles. Progressive activists have been
widely exposed to Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim
Crow,82 which succeeded in popularizing arguments about
structural racism in criminal justice as few texts by
professionals had before. Moreover, many of today’s

80. See Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and
Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States, 29 ANTIPODE 303,
305–06 (1997); Justin Olson & Scott MacDonald, Washington’s War on the Visibly
Poor: A Survey of Criminalizing Ordinances & Their Enforcement, in SEATTLE U.
SCH. L. HOMELESS RTS. ADVOC. PROJECT 1–4 (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602318; TamiIwamoto, Adding
Insult to Injury: Criminalization of Homelessness in Los Angeles, 29 WHITTIER L.
REV. 515, 515–19 (2007).
81. See Alan Stone, The Place of Law in the Marxian Structure-Superstructure
Archetype, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 40, 41, 65 (1985).
82. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
ix-xi (2d ed. 2012).
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activists came to support criminal justice in the aftermath
of the Ferguson riots: they have been reading excellent
journalistic coverage of the criminal justice system 83 and
listening to podcasts about miscarriages of justice 84 for
years. Activists can easily see through laws that are
facially egalitarian but differentially enforced. This should
be good news for critical criminologists, who for decades
struggled to gain influence in the progressive mainstream
and is largely to the credit of academics willing to engage
in public outreach and journalists who simplified and
popularized the academic arguments.
Second, laws employing a universal language at least
open the possibility of enforcement reform and reinforce,
albeit superficially, the shared value of equality before the
law. By contrast, laws that openly target particular
populations cement partisan animosity toward these
populations, which then legitimizes overt denial of their
civil rights.
In any case, it would be farfetched to assume, with no
evidence, that current trends in progressive activism
borrow from Maoism with full awareness of the
consequences. An Occam’s Razor approach toward the
intellectual roots question leads to a much simpler answer:
progressive punitivism is simultaneously more and less
imaginative than the scholarly conversation about these
themes. It is more imaginative in the sense that it steps
beyond showing comparisons and focusing on the
oppressed to direct popular focus toward the oppressors
and their behavior, and less so in the sense that it relies
on limited, conventional rhetorical tropes, which could

83. Cf. German Lopez, Why You Can’t Blame Mass Incarceration on the War
on Drugs, VOX (May 30, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/
2017/5/30/15591700/mass-incarceration-john-pfaff-locked-in; Matt Thompson,
Imagining the Presence of Justice, THE ATLANTIC (May 3, 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/national/archive/2017/05/criminal-justice-across-america-reporting
-project/524985/.
84. Cf. Serial: Season One, WBEZ (2014) (downloaded using iTunes).
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benefit from the refreshing diversity of recourses and
remedies offered by creative scholars with a deep
understanding of the market, public-private intersection,
and the dynamics of incentives. As I explain in the next
Section, this is not surprising given how steeped
Americans of all stripes are in punitive logics.
E. Progressive Punitivism and the American Psyche: A
Natural Extension of the Punitive State Logic
The emergence of a progressive punitive logic in the
United States is not particularly surprising if one keeps in
mind that the political left and right do not operate in
separate universes. The American public, as well as the
American academic scene, has experienced decades of
exposure to punitive ideologies and policies, and these, as
well as their legacies, are bound to leave imprints on social
movements of all stripes. Criminal justice and punishment
scholarship in the United States is steeped in this punitive
legacy. Early accounts of the punitive turn typically blamed
Nixon and Reagan for the policies that increased mass
incarceration; in Making Crime Pay, Katherine Beckett
shows how Richard Nixon’s racialized fears of the civil rights
movement fueled his campaign, and how the moral panic he
generated about rising crime rates—rather than the actual
rise in crime rates—led to his election and the execution of
his policies.85 Elizabeth Hinton, as well as Beckett, also
identified Ronald Reagan and his war on drugs as a central
culprit in the criminalization and demonization of
Americans.86 The centrality of race for this campaign of
criminal labeling is not lost on either commentator and is
also front and center in Michelle Alexander’s book.87

85. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 39 (1997).

AND
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86. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 307 (2016).
87. See ALEXANDER, supra note 81, at 1.
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But recently, academic commentators have tended to
view the Nixon and Reagan presidencies not as a break from
what preceded them, but rather as the continuation of
policies espoused by liberal presidents that already targeted
and stigmatized poor people of color. Hinton’s book is a case
in point: her narrative emphasizes the reliance of the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations on the idea of the
pathologies of the black family and its connection to
delinquency. Similarly, Marie Gottschalk in The Prison and
the Gallows88 and Naomi Murakawa in The First Civil
Right89 have highlighted the role of mainstream Democrats,
as well as civil rights activists, in bringing about punitive
consequences. James Forman’s Locking Up Our Own90
examines how well-meaning African American lawmakers
and law enforcement officials marshaled the tools they were
familiar with—criminalization, harsh policing, tough
sentencing—to
solve
problems
for
crime-ridden
communities, and how these tools backfired and worsened
the situation for those communities.
These newer works expand the field of responsibility by
arguing that conservative actors did not corner the market
on relying on the criminal justice apparatus as the
quintessential solution to society’s ills. As Jonathan Simon
argues, the pressure to address social malaise through the
metaphor of crime is a feature of late modernity, exercising
pressure on Republican and Democrat politicians alike to
appear “tough on crime.”91 In other words, institutions and
actors across the political spectrum have regularly
approached social problems with a criminal justice hammer

88. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 2 (2006).
89. NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON
AMERICA 143–47 (2014).
90. JAMES FORMAN, LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 217 (2017).
91. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 5 (2009).
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in hand, and it is therefore no surprise that all these
problems looked like criminal justice nails.
The tendency to recur to criminal justice methods to
solve systemic problems has been exacerbated by three
additional features of the punitive turn. The first is the rising
importance of victims as the leading constituency in shaping
values and priorities. In Governing Through Crime,
Jonathan Simon argues that the quintessential defining
metaphor of the American citizen has come to be the
potential victim, replacing the yeoman farmer and small
businessman of yesteryear.92 Indeed, a very particular kind
of victims-rights discourse has come to dominate criminal
justice conversations—a discourse portraying the criminal
justice system as a zero-sum game between the opposing
categories of offenders and victims, in which harsher
punishment for the former is an unqualified good for the
latter.93 This perspective narrows the American imagination
to punitive perspectives as the only available method for
expressing care for victims’ experiences, and marginalizes
alternative important avenues to honor victims, such as
restorative justice, victim-offender mediation, and coalitions
to end violence.
The second important feature of the punitive turn is, of
course, that it is deeply embedded structural inequalities
and its effects are unevenly distributed across class, gender,
and race. It is now widely acknowledged that, while one in
one hundred Americans is behind bars, that figure is much
higher for particular segments of the American population:
one in nine young black men is incarcerated, and one in three
92. Id. at 77.
93. For a theoretical critique of this victim model, and the suggestions of
others, see Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 671, 706 (1999). For an analysis of the political power of victims in
the incarceration arena, see JOSH PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS,
PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN CALIFORNIA (2011). For an
analysis of the rise of victims to dominate the moral conversation at parole
hearings, see HADAR AVIRAM, YESTERDAY’S MONSTERS: THE MANSON FAMILY CASES
AND THE ILLUSION OF PAROLE 52–54 (forthcoming 2020).
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is under some form of correctional supervision.94 Racial and
class inequalities are found at every turn: in policing,95 in
criminal courtrooms,96 and in sentencing,97 to name just a
few. Many criminal justice critics, in academia and in the
activist realm, treat this overrepresentation not as a
coincidence, but rather as part of a systemic project of
crystallizing and enhancing inequalities.98
The third feature shared by conservative and progressive
punitivism relates to the role of high-profile individual
cases—“redball crimes”—as powerful rhetorical devices for
systemic reform. Conservative punitivism has succeeded in
transforming public opinion and public policy through the
visibility and symbolism of Willie Horton, whose crimes were
prominent in George H.W. Bush’s presidential campaign.99
Each of these cautionary tales served the conservative
punitive agenda by progressive punitivism; Richard Allen
Davis, murderer of Polly Klaas, was the trigger for the Three
Strikes Law;100 and the Manson family murders figured
prominently in the creation of California’s “extreme

94. One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008, PEW CTR. ON STATES 3-6 (2008),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2008/one20i
n20100pdf.pdf.
95. CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL,
PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP xv–xvii (2014).
96. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 15 (2016).
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97. Michael Tonry, Fifty Years of American Sentencing Reform—Nine
Lessons, 48 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2019).
98. See ALEXANDER, supra note 81, at 1; PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIPHOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 184–85 (2009); ANGELA DAVIS, POLICING THE BLACK MAN:
ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT xiv–xvi (2017); EPP ET AL., supra note
94, at 148–50; VAN CLEVE, supra note 95, at 181.
99. David C. Anderson & Catherine Enberg, Crime and Politics of Hysteria:
How the Willie Horton Story Changed American Justice, 11 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
JUST. 298 (1995); Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited,
MARSHALL PROJ. (May 13, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited.
100. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS
PUNISHMENT, passim (2003).
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punishment trifecta”: the return of the death penalty, the
birth of life in prison without parole, and the punitive turn
in parole policies.101 Progressive punitivism seeks to make
individual cases into “conversation starters” as well: the
Kavanaugh hearing102 and Brock Turner’s sentencing103 are
just two examples. But while this rhetorical device—relying
on a case with high emotional valence to make a systemic
argument—works well in service of conservative goals, it
backfires when used in service of progressive goals, for
reasons I explain in the next Section.
These characteristics of the punitive turn are now firmly
seared into the American psyche. Not only is criminal justice
perceived as the default avenue for addressing social
problems, but it is also inexorably linked to the idea of group
identity for both accusers and accused, and victims.
As a conservative program, punitivism has had
destructive effects on people and communities, which have
been widely documented in the literature. But as I detail
next, progressive punitivism also poses disturbing questions
about values, priorities, and alliances, which raise objections
about its promise as a problem-solving paradigm.
F. Challenges and Problems
Highlighting the discontents of progressive punitivism
should not imply that its targets are blameless, or that they
ordinarily suffer a harsher fate than the usual people on the
receiving end of the legal process. These criticisms are best
understood, therefore, as implying that progressive activism
expends unnecessary energy on pursuing the accountability
of individuals, some more deserving than others, that would
be better spent elsewhere. I offer here some preliminary
101. AVIRAM, supra note 93.
102. Hadar Aviram, The Master’s Tools Shall Never Dismantle the Master’s
House: Kavanaugh’s Confirmation Hearings and the Perils of Progressive
Punitivism, 33 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. (forthcoming 2019).
103. Hamilton-Smith, supra note 16.
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thoughts about the problems of viewing the progressive
reform project through a punitive prism.
First, the emphasis on punishment of individual
wrongdoers as an educational lesson confounds personal
pathology with situational evil. The lessons of Stanley
Milgram’s renown obedience to authority experiment,104 as
well as Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experiment,105 are
well taken: bad behavior, including serious displays of
cruelty and sadism, is largely situational. It is perhaps ironic
that movements that set out to highlight the systemic power
imbalances that enable evils like abuse of power to prevail
have focused their efforts on a method of redress that is best
suited for adjudicating personal pathologies. One of the best
examples of this mismatch is the progressive outrage about
the confirmation hearings of Brett Kavanaugh to the
Supreme Court. As I argue elsewhere, the focus on
Kavanaugh’s personal pathology, dishonesty, and misogyny
has weakened the broader takeaway from the hearings: that
Kavanaugh, lamentably, is a man of his time and place, and
the effort to individually pathologize men like Kavanaugh
creates a risk of normalizing the cultural Petri dish in which
he and others operate.106
Second, criminal justice is limited as a paradigm of
reform by its very nature: waiting for an incident to occur so
that the social reaction to it will trigger reform hangs the
success of reform on the happenstance of particular
occurrence. The dependence “case and controversy” to seek
an opportunity of reform means that the lightning rod for
public ire is largely left to chance, or to a movement’s
preferences and idiosyncrasies. Sometimes, instances of poor
104. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW viii
(First Harper Perennial Modern Thought 2009) (1974).
105. Technical Report from Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo,
Stanford University, to Office of Naval Research, Interpersonal Dynamics in a
Simulated Prison, 1 (Oct. 1972), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
751041.pdf.
106. Aviram, supra note 102.
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behavior—racism, sexual assault, police brutality—that
come to light in the context of an individual lawsuit are less
egregious than the ones that remain in darkness. But
because grand juries, courts, and legislative hearings
approach reality on a case-by-case basis, the individual
incidents that become the focal point of discussion offer little
knowledge of the scope and breadth of a particular problem.
Again, while the Kavanaugh hearings yielded a “national
conversation” of questionable quality, they did not teach us
much about the scope of the problem or how to address it.
Third, even if individual instances of public outrage are
laudable in the aggregate, they can drain the movement of
energy and resources. The emphasis on criminalization and
harsh sentencing draws efforts away from other laudable,
systemic reforms that are less attractive to the public and
thus less visible. Movements to reform social ills must spend
their limited energy and resources in directions that might
prove most productive. To focus a movement on mobbing and
stigmatizing one particular person is to spend finite capital—
money, time, and verve—on a particular case under the
unproven assumption that the case will produce systemic
change.
Fourth, some difficult questions must be asked of the
American tendency of both progressives and conservatives to
place victims at the forefront of policy and reform. The
validation and empowerment of victims is deeply
compromised by the way in which victim-centered punitive
processes reify victimization to a point that is unhealthy not
only to offenders, but also to the victims themselves, and sets
up “victimization competitions.” The conservative victims’
rights movement brought about many of the excesses of the
1990s and the 2000s, and its progressive counterpart, albeit
considerably less destructive overall, can wreak havoc in
cases that do not merit punitivism, merely because of the
strength and power of the interlocutor-victims. The empirical
debate on the percentage of false complaints of sexual abuse,
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which was reignited by the Kavanaugh hearings,107 does not
have an easy resolution precisely because it is difficult to
know the correct answer.108 Progressives and conservatives
disagree not only on the rate of false accusations, but also on
the existence or absence of incentives to falsely accuse.109
Some progressive commentators openly accept the possibility
of false accusations, but claim that such miscarriages of
justice are “acceptable casualties” in the broader war against
sexual misconduct.110 This argument may be persuasive to
some in the progressive left, but it is understandable why it
would leave many moderates and progressives unimpressed.
More importantly, making victimization the centerpiece of
reform is dangerous in that it strengthens the already
unhealthy premise that a necessary condition to having a
stake in social reform is claiming a status of oppression and
victimization, which requires people to marinate in their
victimization experience longer than their healing
107. See Peter Baker, ‘It Was All Fake,’ Trump Misleadingly Says of
Kavanaugh Accusations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018, 3:55 PM), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/11/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford.html;
Margery Egan, The Myth of False Accusations of Sexual Assault, BOSTON GLOBE
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/10/14/the-myth-falseaccusations-sexual-assault/Qsy2s4MgJ0k0CXyVjSZcKM/story.html.
108. A recent meta-analysis of seven studies found that “confirmed false
allegations of sexual assault made to police occur at a significant rate. The total
false reporting rate, including both confirmed and equivocal cases, would be
greater than the 5% rate found.” Claire Ferguson & John Malouff, Assessing
Police Classifications of Sexual Assault Reports: A Meta-Analysis of False
Reporting Rates, 45 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1185, 1185 (2016).
109. André W. E. A. de Zutter, Robert Horselenberg & Peter van Koppen,
Motives for Filing a False Allegation of Rape, 47 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 457,
458–59 (2018) (recognizing some motivations for false allegations of sexual
misconduct).
110. For a comprehensive exposition about the overreach of #metoo
accusations, see Jia Tolentino, The Rising Pressure of the #MeToo Backlash, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/therising-pressure-of-the-metoo-backlash. For an example of support for due process
restrictions for the benefit of the movement, see Ezra Klein, “Yes Means Yes” is a
Terrible Law, and I Completely Support It, VOX (Oct. 13, 2014, 10:30 AM), https://
www.vox.com/2014/10/13/6966847/yes-means-yes-is-a-terrible-bill-and-i-complet
ely-support-it?fbclid=IwAR0jmDw9p5o705Xiqyt5wvlX0AQLF4DR0eaCqK1dFH
XCeTw6VHNaJ9YTGN8.
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requires.111 And finally, emphasizing retribution as a central
tool in the reform arsenal places the onus on victims to
complain and to position themselves against offenders,
marginalizing the voices of many victims for whom there is
no clear dichotomy between victim and offender, and whose
take on their predicament does not take an accusatory
tone.112
A poignant example of the above point was the cultural
dissection of Amber Guyger’s trial for the murder of her nextdoor neighbor, Botham Jean.113 Guyger, a white woman and
an off-duty Dallas police officer, argued that she shot her
African American neighbor because she mistook Jean’s
apartment for her own. At her sentencing hearing, the
victim’s brother, Brandt Jean, asked the judge’s permission
to hug Guyger, and offered her his forgiveness: “If you truly
are sorry, I know . . . I can speak for myself, I forgive you . . . .
I’m not going to say I hope you rot and die just like my
brother did, but I, personally, want the best for you.”114 This
offer of forgiveness by Brandt, a devout Christian, “spark[ed]
a debate over forgiving,”115 in which some commentators
opined that Brandt’s gesture of mourning his brother
according to his faith and character should not be
“cheapened” by white Christians, who have historically

111. See Kathryne M. Young, Parole Hearings and Victims’ Rights:
Implementation, Ambiguity, and Reform, 49 CONN. L. REV. 431, 434 (2016).
112. For alternative models sensitive to victim perspectives, see Roach, supra
note 93, at 672–73, 699.
113. Elliott McLaughlin & Steve Almasy, Amber Guyger gets 10-year murder
sentence for fatally shooting Botham Jean, CNN (Oct. 3, 2019, 4:05am),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/02/us/amber-guyger-trial-sentencing/index.html.
114. Jonathan Culver, “I Want the Best for You”: Botham Jean’s Brother Hugs
Amber Guyger in Emotional Courtroom Scene, USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2019,
6:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/10/02/amber-guyge
r-sentencing-botham-jeans-brother-embraces-guyger/3847967002/.
115. Bill Chappell & Richard Gonzales, Brandt Jean’s Act Of Grace Toward
His Brother’s Killer Sparks A Debate Over Forgiving, NPR (Oct. 3, 2019,
4:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/03/766866875/brandt-jeans-act-of-gracetoward-his-brother-s-killer-sparks-a-debate-over-forgi.
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benefitted from “Black forgiveness,”116 and even opining on
whether it is “wrong to forgive” where “injustice still
exists.”117 While this commentary more explicitly criticized
the conduct of Guyger’s judge (who also hugged her and gave
her a bible), the attributes of progressive punitivism were on
full display: critique of the system for not “ratcheting up”
Guyger’s treatment to the level experienced by African
American defendants, contextual critique of an instance in
which a victim did not follow a punitive script, and the
assertion that forgiveness and redeemability would be the
wrong approach in a case characterized by racial undertones.
Fifth, the reliance on identity as the logic underpinning
targets for criminal enforcement poses problems of
consistency, believability, and plausibility. Because
progressive punitivism is characterized by drawing attention
particularly to the plight of particular groups of victims
associated with underprivileged status, calls for reforming
the criminal process in a punitive direction often carry a
mandate to categorically believe, or disbelieve, not just
individuals but collectives of people. But in a universe of
intersectional identities, the consequences of this mandate
are unclear. Consider the case of “Cornerstore Caroline,” a
woman who complained about being harassed by an 8-yearold boy, which was ultimately determined unfounded.118 In a
world in which categorical alliances are inexorably linked to
identities, what is the appropriate resolution of such a case?
116. Jemar Tisby, White Christians, Do Not Cheapen the Hug and Message of
Forgiveness from Botham Jean’s Brother, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019, 12:36 PM)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2019/10/03/white-christians-do-notcheapen-hug-message-forgiveness-botham-jeans-brother/.
117. Heather Sells, “Weaponizing” Forgiveness in the Botham Jean Case: Is It
Wrong to Forgive When Injustice Still Exists?, CBN NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2019/october/weaponizing-forgiveness-in-thebotham-jean-case-is-it-wrong-to-forgive-when-injustice-still-exists.
118. Kristine Phillips, A Black Child’s Backpack Brushed Up Against a
Woman. She Called 911 to Report a Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2018,
8:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/10/13/black-childs-back
pack-brushed-up-against-woman-she-called-report-sexual-assault/?utm_term=.c
b3c1cf74266.
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If we want women to be categorically believed, where does
that leave the boy who was falsely accused? Moreover, where
does that leave all the men and boys of color who, throughout
America’s fraught history with hypersexualized black
masculinity, have been falsely accused of sexually
inappropriate behavior with white women, such as Emmett
Till119 and the Scottsboro Boys?120 By contrast, if our primary
allegiance is to people of color, where do we leave victims of
color, given the robust empirical evidence that most crime is
committed intra-racially?121 Confounding the personal with
the political, the individual facts with the interest of
protecting groups and identities, leave these dilemmas
unanswered, particularly if moderate voices calling for caseby-case assessments of truth are vilified.122
But worse, the rhetorical device of using high-profile
cases to prove an individual point, which has so effectively
galvanized politicians and voters alike for conservative
causes, backfires when used for progressive causes—for the
very reasons that progressives so often decry. When
conservatives warn of the dangers of another Willie Horton
and propose to address them by increasing punishment
across the board, their individual case matches their general
policy, resulting in overall “total incapacitation” for all

119. Elliott McLaughlin & Emanuella Grinberg, Justice Department Reopens
Investigation Into 63-Year-Old Murder of Emmett Till, CNN (July 13, 2018,
12:23 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/12/us/emmett-till-murder-case-reopen
ed-doj/index.html.
120. JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES
(1994).
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121. See William Wilbanks, Is Violent Crime Intraracial?, 31 CRIME & DELINQ.
117, 117–26 (1985).
122. One example in which those invoking new facts and a broader context
were excoriated for racism was the video of an altercation between Catholic
schoolboys mocking a Native American elder. See, e.g., Laura Wagner, Don’t
Doubt What You Saw With Your Own Eyes, DEADSPIN (Jan. 21, 2019, 8:08 PM),
https://theconcourse.deadspin.com/dont-doubt-what-you-saw-with-your-own-eye
s-1831931203?fbclid=IwAR2JD1ZGjOazF-woL1Ptq8cnWR-iRBsEuEahbjxUWX
ZVkEN_hQodbEgH1Cg.
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prisoners.123 By contrast, when progressives call for harsh
punishment and highlight a case in which the defendant is
powerful, the first people in line to suffer from an overall
harsh punishment policy will be the much more frequent
sufferers in the criminal justice web: poor defendants of color
who look nothing like the individuals showcased in the
progressive punitive campaign. Judge Persky’s recall
campaign is a classic example: sending a message to judges
that leniency can result in mob retaliation is likely to make
judges harsher across the board, and since the criminal
defendant population is disproportionately poor, black, or
brown, the effects of the campaign will be felt far more
acutely by the people that very same progressive campaign
seeks to protect.124
Sixth, engaging in a framework that feeds on outrage
takes an emotional toll. Progressive punitivism builds
largely on a platform of understandable, and often
justifiable, rage. Efforts to criticize the underlying angry
animus of the movement are often categorized as “tone
policing,” and rejected.125 But what we know about rage
suggests that it has an ambiguous contribution to social
change. On one hand, anger can drive one to action when
channeled in a useful direction.126 What animates much of
the logic behind campaigns of revelation and reckoning is the
notion that expressing anger has a cathartic function, the
evidence for which, unfortunately, is mixed at best. What
experiments and studies of online behavior have shown is
that anger is often a generative emotion; feeling and
123. JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT
DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA (2014).
124. Robert Salonga, DA Report Scrutinizes Ongoing Racial Disparities in
Santa Clara County Prosecutions, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019,
6:00 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/02/19/da-report-scrutinizes-ongoi
ng-racial-disparities-in-prosecutions/.
125. For a good introduction for the use and abuse of the term, see Laura
Portwood-Stacer & Susan Berridge, Introduction: Privilege and Difference in
(Online) Feminist Activism, 14 FEMINIST MEDIA STUD. 519, 519 (2014).
126. See Albert Rothenberg, On Anger, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 454, 460 (1971).
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expressing rage leads to feeling and expressing more rage,
and can sometimes backfire spectacularly when the anger is
marshaled at effecting change.127 Pursuing justice through
punitive means, particularly in the frequent cases in which
the system falls short of delivering it, can intensify anger and
rage, and lead to potential spillovers in which rage can be
directed at undeserving targets.
Finally, punitivism is countereffective in coalition
building. As progressives know all too well from decades of
being on the receiving end of shaming and excoriation, these
are not particularly effective techniques for garnering
cooperation and building coalitions. If the ultimate goal of
the movement is to bring about social change, a considerable
aspect of the reform effort should be directed at building
bridges and opening opportunities for cooperative, inclusive
discussion. Unfortunately, when the weapons of choice are
stigma and calls for indictments, incarceration, and
shaming, political opponents are more likely to leap to the
defense of the target than to come to the table in the spirit of
cooperation. Unfortunately, being on the receiving end of a
shaming experience without appropriate opportunities for
reintegration merely fosters a sense of enmity and rancor,128
and therefore an unsatisfying platform for building alliances.

127. See Russell G. Geen, David Stonner & Gary L. Shope, The Facilitation of
Aggression by Aggression: Evidence Against the Catharsis Hypothesis,
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 721, 725 (1975); Jennifer Parlamis, Keith G.
Allred & Caryn Block, Letting Off Steam or Just Steaming?, 21 INT’L J. CONFLICT
MGMT. 260, 260 (2000); Carol Tavris, On the Wisdom of Counting to Ten: Personal
and Social Dangers of Anger Expression, 5 REV. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
170, 170 (1984); João Vieira da Cunha & Wanda J. Orlikowski, Performing
Catharsis: The Use of Online Discussion Forums in Organizational Change,
18 INFO. & ORG. 132, 132 (2008).
128. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 54–55 (1989).
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CONCLUSION
The concept of progressive punitivism allows us to
examine a disturbing cultural trend through a lens that is
simultaneously more general and more specific than the
existing critiques. Recent contributions to the criminal
justice literature have highlighted specific manifestations of
the disconcerting aspects of progressive punitivism129, but
have regarded them as unique to the particular movements
in which they arise; noticing common, more general punitive
trends across the progressive milieu is crucial. At the same
time, progressive punitivism highlights the specific criminal
justice aspects of broader discontents with progressive
discourse and activism. Commentators have focused on the
alienating nature of identity politics and on the difficulty
building coalitions across fragmented and hostile identitybased interest groups,130 particularly when identities are
inconsistently portrayed as immutable or changeable;131 on
the inability to tolerate, and engage with, alternative
perspectives in the guise of protection of the vulnerable;132 on
the culture of a “left that eats its own” and is deeply critical
of its own allies, to the point of ostracizing people for
minutiae and semantics;133 and on the weakening effect the
echo chamber of the left has had on its persuasive power and
ability to reach change.134 Progressive punitivism can be
129. See generally JUSTIN MERCEAU, BEYOND CAGES: ANIMAL LAW AND CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT (2019) (regarding animal cruelty); AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR
ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS
INCARCERATION (2020) (regarding sexual harassment and assault).
130. MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS 14–
15 (2017).
131. See Adolph Reed Jr., Antiracism: A Neoliberal Alternative to a Left, 42
DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 105 passim (2018).
132. E.g., JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED 4 (2015).
133. See generally DIANNA ANDERSON, PROBLEMATIC: HOW TOXIC CALLOUT
CULTURE IS DESTROYING FEMINISM (2018).
134. See generally GREGG LUKIANOFF & JONATHAN HAIDT, THE CODDLING OF THE
AMERICAN MIND: HOW GOOD INTENTIONS AND BAD IDEAS ARE SETTING UP A
GENERATION FOR FAILURE (2018).
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seen as the criminological extension of these disconcerting
trends.
The general observations mentioned above are
particularly important because they map out possible
pushback against the critique of progressive punitivism. My
concern is that critiques of the intolerance, intellectual
fragility, and scorched-earth mentality at the bottom of the
efforts to “level up” the punitive apparatus to include targets
that the left dislikes are going to be dismissed as “tone
policing” and dampening righteous rage. There is no doubt,
given the realities of the last few decades, that powerless and
disenfranchised sectors in American society have every
reason to feel rage at the institutions that failed them. But
there should be room for a good-faith conversation on how
best to productively channel that rage.
Some promising avenues include the recent trend toward
progressive prosecution. Since some scholars have identified
county prosecutors as a dominant driving force in mass
incarceration,135 several elections have seen the triumph of
prosecutors committed to ratcheting down the penal
apparatus.136 Real Justice, a PAC focused on the struggle for
racial equality, focuses on supporting the campaigns of
progressive prosecutors.137
Similarly, the welcome tendency to listen to affected and
traumatized communities can, and should, be expanded
beyond the appetite for punishment. For example, legislative
fixes that ostensibly protect sex workers as victims of abuse,
such as the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA) and
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
(FOSTA), turn out to be ineffective and counterproductive,

135. See JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES
(2017).
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136. Such recent campaigns resulted in Larry Krasner’s victory in
Philadelphia and Marilyn Mosby’s appointment in Baltimore; in San Francisco,
public defender Chesa Boudin is running for District Attorney.
137. REAL JUSTICE, https://realjusticepac.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
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and important voices of sex workers are heard in the debate
on what to do; the classic tendency to direct the penal
machine toward pimps or clients does not necessarily
advance the interests of sex workers, and there is an
increasing understanding that people living the realities of
sex work are an important source of knowledge and policy
suggestions beyond the deployment of penal techniques.138
Because of the proliferation of progressive punitivism on
social media, it is important to bring these nonpunitive
perspectives into public discourse and encourage progressive
activists, as well as progressive voters, to expand their
imagination beyond punishment. Shaun King and
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s willingness to stand with reform
and against divisive paradigms, even in the defense of
someone like Paul Manafort, is an admirable step in the right
direction. If holding the criminal justice hammer in hand has
led to seeing various social problems as nails, it is time to
hand the public a few new hammers, and see the project of
equality in America not as a fight to destroy, but as a fight to
build.

138. KATIE HALL-JARES, COREY SHDEIMAH & CHRYSANTHI LEON, CHALLENGING
PERSPECTIVES ON STREET-BASED SEX WORK 3 (2017).

